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The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is the 
flagship welfare programme of the UPA government, and the largest of its kind in 
India. One of its main objectives is a significant reduction in labour migration through 
the provision of locally available work in rural areas, but in spite of some successes, 
the programme has not had the wished-for impact. Drawing on government data, 
recent independent studies and the Indian media, the present article argues that 
NREGA’s limited impact partly stems from a misconception of labour migration – as 
a poverty ‘problem’ and as merely a product of ‘push-and-pull’ economic factors. It 
contends that this view wrongfully casts ‘rural’ livelihoods and ‘urban’ society as 
somehow separate, and assumes that farming is what ‘the poor’ really want, thus 
establishing poverty as chiefly a rural problem to be tackled by rural development. 
Accepted explanations for NREGA’s relative failure do not account for the possibility 
that migration for work may be perceived as a more attractive activity. The view of 
labour mobility as essentially ‘involuntary’ and driven solely by economic 
considerations overshadows two sets of reasons why people may still prefer to 
migrate; namely social factors and evolving perceptions of ‘modernity’. The poor too 
have aspirations, which are not restricted to survival matters. NREGA has benefitted 
those with little or no access to positive migration opportunities, especially Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes, but is unlikely to succeed in curbing labour mobility significantly – 
which is not desirable anyway. Here, the crucial development challenges are not to 
reduce migration but to improve its conditions, both economic and social – and to 
account for the poor’s aspirational horizons. 
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NREGA… [should help] in reducing the number of migrant 
labourers in the country as employment is being provided to them in 
their own villages. 
 
(Indian Labour Minister Mallikarjun Kharge, cited in The Economic 
Times, 2010) 
 
The poor, no less than any other group in a society, do express 
horizons in choices made and choices voiced, often in terms of 
specific goods and outcomes, often material and proximate, like 
doctors for their children, markets for their grain, husbands for their 
daughters, and tin roofs for their homes. But these lists, apparently 
just bundles of individual and idiosyncratic wants, are inevitably 
tied up with more general norms, presumptions, and axioms about 
the good life, and life more generally. 
 
(Appadurai 2004: 68) 
 
 
Introduction 
The role and scale of temporary labour 
migration is often under-estimated; more 
people are involved in it than in international 
migration in India, and the poor, less educated 
and lower caste are less likely to embark on 
longer-distance mobility1, which generally 
requires greater assets, skills and social capital 
(Gardner and Osella 2003; Breman 1996; de 
Haan 1999; Skeldon 2003; Deshingkar 2008). 
Labour mobility has long been an important 
part of the lives of poor people across the 
country (de Haan and Rogaly 2002; Gardner 
and Osella 2003; Coffey, Papp and Spears 
2011) and, contrary to earlier expectations, it is 
not decreasing (Deshingkar 2008). Actually, 
studies from different parts of the country show 
                                                
1 Although the use of these terms has been a matter for 
debate, for the sake of simplicity ‘migration’ and 
‘mobility’ are used interchangeably here. 
that temporary migration for work, be it 
seasonal migration or shorter-term move-
ments, is increasing markedly, both in absolute 
numbers and relatively to the country’s 
population (Breman 1996; Rogaly et al 2003;  
Gardner and Osella 2003; Bhagat 2009; 
Deshingkar and Start 2003; cf. Deshingkar 
2008 for a review of some of the relevant 
literature). Yet, development policies and 
welfare programmes often aim to reduce labour 
migration in one way or another (de Haan and 
Rogaly 2002). The latest, and largest of those 
programmes put in place in India is the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA or NREGA), 
which came into effect in February 2006. In 
spite of some successes, on the whole the Act 
has had a limited impact so far (see the third 
section below).  
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In this light, the present article argues that 
NREGA’s relative failure may be partly due to 
its misconception of temporary labour 
migration as a ‘negative force’ (Jacob 2008) 
and as essentially ‘involuntary’. The 
programme’s aim to reduce significantly the 
number of migrant labourers in India is 
unlikely to be successful, and is misguided. 
In order to justify these claims, this article 
will begin with a brief discussion of some of 
the current debates surrounding labour 
migration in India – who moves, and why –, 
establishing that the livelihoods of the ‘rural’ 
poor in the country are generally 
‘multilocational’ (Deshingkar and Farrington 
2009). The second section will be concerned 
with showing that the design of NREGA is 
largely based upon a misconception of 
migration for work as a development 
‘problem’. Lastly, it will be argued that the 
relative failure of the programme to attract 
many takers may be partly due to its misguided 
focus on curbing labour mobility. 
 
Labour migration in India: Multi-locational 
livelihoods of the poor 
Who moves? 
Labour migration seldom involves the 
migrant alone. The decision to migrate is often 
taken within the household, with 
considerations of wider family and/or 
community contexts (Skeldon 2003). The 
stereotype of the individual, male labour 
migrant is somewhat misleading in the context 
of India; a considerable proportion of migrants 
are women, and many migrants take their 
families with them (Shah 2006; Skeldon 2003; 
Rogaly et al 2003). 
In general, it is not the poorest of the poor 
who migrate. Migration requires capital – to 
cover the costs of the journey and potential 
unforeseen problems along the way or during 
the stay; social networks – for example 
knowing the employer or people in the area of 
destination; and access to information – 
especially work opportunities (Skeldon 1997; 
Deshingkar and Start 2003; de Haan 1999; 
Rogaly et al 2003). Those are scarcer amongst 
the poorest, who often do not know of positive 
migration opportunities and/or cannot afford to 
move (de Haan 1999; Skeldon 2003).  
Caste also plays an important role in 
determining who has access to positive 
migration opportunities, largely because of the 
strong correlation, up to this day, between 
poverty and social exclusion on the one hand, 
and belonging to a Scheduled Caste (SC) or 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) on the other (Desai and 
Dubey 2011; Deshingkar and Start 2003; 
Mosse 2007). Whether the discrimination SCs 
and STs face is less in ‘modern’ markets than 
in ‘traditional’ village societies is “a hotly 
debated point” (Deshingkar 2008: 174), but it 
is certainly not nil. This is not to say that the 
very poor and/or socially excluded never 
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 21 
move; however, when they do it is often 
‘involuntarily’ – this will be discussed below. 
 
Why do people move? Competing views 
While migration is increasingly recognised 
as a major factor in the lives of the rural poor, 
in India and elsewhere, there are several 
interpretations of why poor people migrate 
temporarily for work. First, the ‘dual economy’ 
model, which derives from neoclassical 
economics, sees labour mobility as an 
expression of the rational choice of the 
migrant, to move from a poor 
agricultural/rural/traditional area to a richer or 
better paying industrial/urban/modern area 
(Mosse et al 2002: 59). Labour migration is 
seen as a voluntary choice, a “response to 
diverse economic opportunities across space” 
(Jacob 2008: 3), where the migrant is basically 
‘pulled’ out by better economic activities. In 
the Indian context, this is exemplified by a 
praise of ‘growing opportunities’ in the 
informal sector, which accounts for 
approximately 60 percent of the GDP and over 
92 percent of the workforce and provides more 
opportunities to switch rapidly between 
different (low-profile) jobs (Deshingkar 2008).  
Second, Marxist theories emphasise 
structural factors rather than individual agency, 
the exploitation of migrants by the dominant 
classes and the actions of large-scale capital 
through ‘uneven patterns of proletarianisation 
and depeasantisation’ (Breman 1996; de Haan 
and Rogaly 2002). Migrants are ‘pushed’ out 
of peripheral areas. Third, the dominant view 
in development and policy circles is a ‘neo-
Malthusian variant’ of structural analysis, 
where migrants are seen as ‘ecological 
refugees’, pushed out by natural calamities 
(e.g. drought, crop failure), declining 
agricultural opportunities (decreasing 
production, land fragmentation, declining 
agricultural commodity prices), debt cycles, 
demographic pressure, deforesta-tion, soil 
erosion or water scarcity (Mosse et al 2002: 59; 
Deshingkar 2008). In both these 
understandings, labour migration by poor 
people from rural areas is seen as largely 
‘involuntary’, as an expression of distress 
(Deshingkar and Start 2003). 
Over the past fifteen years or so, 
sociological and anthropological studies have 
moved beyond ‘push-and-pull’ analyses, and 
tend to view labour migration as a complex 
process, combin-ing structure and agency and 
rejecting the view that ‘urban’ work and ‘rural’ 
society are somehow separate (de Haan 1999; 
Mosse et al 2002; Rogaly et al 2003; Gardner 
and Osella 2003). They also describe migration 
as a ‘dynamic socio-political process’ (Shah 
2006: 93) rather than as purely economic, and 
as part of the ‘normal’ livelihood strategy of 
poor people across India, not only during times 
of crisis (Deshingkar and Start 2003; de Haan 
1999; Rogaly et al 2003; Mosse et al 2002; de 
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 22 
Haan and Rogaly 2002; Gardner and Osella 
2003). In other words, the livelihoods of the 
rural poor in India are ‘multilocational’ 
(Deshingkar and Farring-ton 2009). Here, 
‘livelihood’ does not mean mere subsistence, 
but also en-compasses social factors; material 
gains are only one of the reasons why people 
leave – though generally the main one –, and 
only a part of what migrants bring back (de 
Haan and Rogaly 2002). 
Other reasons may include challenging 
existing social relations, gaining skills and 
networks, exploring a new environment, 
escaping social constraints at home (notably in 
the case of women) etc. (de Haan and Rogaly 
2002; Gardner and Osella 2003; Shah 2006). 
The meaning of labour migration in India, 
as well as its drivers, vary from place to place 
and from migrant to migrant; it is very 
difficult, and often problematic, to generalise. 
Nevertheless, it has increasingly been 
considered an important development issue in 
the country, as shows the recent setting up of 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act. 
 
(MG)NREGA: Misconception of labour 
migration as a development ‘problem’ 
Overview: Preventing labour migration as a 
way to alleviate rural poverty 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act was the flagship 
welfare programme of the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government during the General 
Election 2004. It was passed in August 2005 
and launched in February 2006, initially across 
200 districts. It was extended to 330 districts in 
April 2007 and then by another 295 districts 
from April 2008, making up 625 districts out of 
a total of 640 nationwide (Census 2011). The 
Act guarantees up to 100 days of unskilled 
manual work at the statutory minimum wage, 
on a voluntary basis, to adult members of any 
rural house-hold. The work undertaken aims to 
de-velop infrastructure (notably water 
harvesting structures and roads) in rural areas. 
Households are registered by the Gram 
panchayat which issues a job card. 
Applications for work must be submitted in 
written form, either to a Programme Officer or 
to the panchayat. If an applicant is not provided 
with employment within 15 days, he is entitled 
to an unemployment allowance. The 
employment must be pro-vided by the Gram 
panchayat within a 5 km radius (otherwise 
extra wage has to be paid). Being an Act, 
NREGA binds the state to implement it. 
Officially, 25 percent of the funds allocated to 
the programme are provided by the central 
government and the rest by the respective state 
govern-ments. (Government of India 2005; 
Jacob 2008; Khan and Saluja 2007; Marius-
Gnanou 2008) 
Though its scale makes NREGA unique, 
the principle of rural employment programmes 
is not without precedent in India, and NREGA 
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is based on previously existing schemes –such 
as the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MEGS), the National Rural 
Employment Pro-gramme (NREP), the 
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) 
etc. (Datar 2007; Khan and Saluja 2007; Jacob 
2008). In fact, the programme basically aims to 
reduce rural poverty by providing locally 
available work, with a broader view, as then 
Labour Minister Mallikarjun Kharge said in the 
Rajya Sabha, to help “reducing the number of 
migrant labourers in the country as 
employment is being provided to them in their 
own villages” (quoted in The Economic Times, 
2010). This statement exemplifies the view, 
which underpins the design of NREGA and 
which is dominant in development and policy 
circles, of migration as a poverty ‘problem’. 
 
Misconception of labour migration as a 
poverty ‘problem’ 
“How will you reduce migration…?” asked 
(rhetorically) Dr. Mihir Shah, a member of the 
Planning Commission, when questioned about 
the success of NREGA in alleviating rural 
poverty (in Indianomics, 2011); it is widely 
accepted in Indian policy circles – and among 
the urban middle classes – that ‘reducing 
migration’ is a good development measure 
(Jacob 2008; PACS 2007; Economic Times 
2010). Labour migration is under-stood as a 
‘negative force’, as a cause of poverty (Jacob 
2008: 3). The fact that migrants generally do 
not have “continued access to health… and 
welfare facilities” is often invoked to justify 
this position, notably in the context of NREGA 
(Jacob 2008: 6; Khan and Saluja 2007). 
However, this should be seen as a political 
issue rather than as an intrinsic feature of 
labour migration (cf. Tacoli et al 2008); indeed, 
migrants could be included in, rather than 
excluded from, health and welfare systems in 
their area of destination. 
This view of labour migration as a 
‘problem’ (cf. Spencer 2003) stems largely 
from two misconceptions. Firstly, mobility for 
work is viewed essentially as a response to 
crisis or distress –as ‘a sign of rupture’ (de 
Haan 1999: 30). While distress migration does 
take place, especially among the poorest and 
socially excluded, the recent literature shows, 
as discussed in the first section, that this is but 
one type of migration. In most cases mobility is 
an integral part of, and a critical factor in the 
livelihoods of the rural poor in India, and not 
just a response to crisis or an ‘involuntary’ 
undertaking (de Haan 1999; de Haan and 
Rogaly 2002). Therefore, labour mobility 
should be seen as ‘the rule rather than the 
exception’ (Breman 1996: 83). 
Secondly, migration for work is thought to 
be detrimental to migrants, who often end up 
swelling the ranks of the urban poor –a 
phenomenon that Harris and Todaro classically 
described as the ‘urbanisation of poverty’ 
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(1970). Even where migration is profitable, the 
benefits are thought to occur to the detriment 
of social welfare in destination areas, through 
overcrowding and increased inequalities (Jacob 
2008; Khan and Saluja 2007). However, recent 
studies have shown that while the outcomes 
depend on the context – especially the 
resources, both social and economic, that a 
household can command (Mosse et al 2002; 
Gardner and Osella 2003; Skeldon 2003; 
Kothari 2002; de Haan and Rogaly 2002) – and 
are not uniformly positive, labour migration 
tends to improve the lot of most – both the 
migrants and those left behind (Skeldon 2003; 
Deshingkar 2008; de Haan and Rogaly 2002). 
Furthermore, the problem posed by 
unacceptably substandard urban infrastructure 
and services is, yet again, a political issue as 
much as a financial or technical one, as 
regulations often serve to render poor urban-
dwellers’ neighbour-hoods informal or illegal 
rather than to improve them (Tacoli et al 2008). 
Thus, ‘excessive’ labour migration per se is not 
a cause of poverty, and, as Robert Skeldon put 
it, “there is a basic contradiction between 
attempts to control migration on the one hand, 
and poverty alleviation on the other” (Skeldon 
1997: 12). Another misconception, evident in 
what has been discussed above, which 
underpins the design of NREGA is the 
opposition between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ 
livelihoods. 
‘Urban versus rural’ fallacies 
NREGA is designed as ‘a safety net to 
reduce migration by rural poor households in 
the lean [agricultural] period’ (Khan and Saluja 
2007: 26) –the number of work days has been 
limited to 100 because the rest of the year is 
assumed to be dedicated to agricultural work 
(Jacob 2008). Another goal of the programme 
is to rejuvenate agriculture, notably through the 
construction of water harvesting struct-ures, so 
that farmers go ‘back to farming’ (Shah in 
Indianomics 2011). The perceived ‘normal’ 
activity is agriculture – in or around the village 
–, as opposed to migration – to cities – and it is 
assumed that farming is what the poor want (cf. 
de Haan 1999; Deshingkar and Start 2003). 
This approach fails to grasp the dynamic role 
of labour migration in rural livelihoods, and the 
variety of reasons – other than economic – that 
play in one’s decision to leave. In other words, 
it mistakenly attempts to reaffirm what is 
perceived as a ‘disrupted sedentary agri-
cultural community’ (Mosse et al 2002: 60). 
While urbanisation is considered bene-
ficial to social and economic development, 
there is also a conviction that migration should 
be controlled in order to prevent excessive 
urban growth. ‘Rural’ liveli-hoods and ‘urban’ 
society are cast as separate, and this 
assumption underpins the view of poverty as 
chiefly a rural problem, to be tackled by rural 
develop-ment (cf. Tacoli et al 2008). Hence, 
like many other development programmes in 
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India (and elsewhere), the main goal of 
NREGA is to curb labour migration by making 
staying in the village economically more 
attractive (cf. de Haan 1999; Deshingkar and 
Start 2003). However, as argued in the first 
section, for poor people spreading assets and 
activities is often a risk-minimising strategy, 
and migrants generally do not decide whether 
to migrate solely according to economic 
factors. The next section is concerned with 
arguing that these misconceptions on labour 
migration may be part of the reason why 
NREGA has had a limited impact so far. 
 
The limited impact of NREGA: partly due 
to its misguided focus on curbing labour 
migration? 
NREGA’s relative failure: Accepted 
explanations 
As Naomi Jacob stated, “[t]here is an 
article every week pointing out the regions 
where NREGA has failed miserably.” (2008: 1) 
While in some places –especially (though 
unevenly) in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
Gujarat and Rajasthan– and amongst 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes 
(ST), the programme has been fairly successful 
and has employed over 40% of women (cf. 
PACS 2007; Khan and Saluja 2007; Jacob 
2008; Marius-Gnanou 2008; Ministry of Rural 
Development 2012b), it is a matter for 
consensus that on the whole it has not had the 
expected impact (Jacob 2008; Khan and Saluja 
2007; Das 2008; Datar 2007; Dhar 2011; 
Siddharta and Vanaik 2008). 
Every year since its launching in 2006, 
around 25% of the funds allocated to the 
programme are not being used, and though in 
absolute numbers the demand has increased 
(cf. Ministry of Rural Develop-ment 2012a, 
2012b; Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation 2011: Table 35.1), so has the 
coverage –from 200 districts in 2006 to the 
entire country (upwards of 600 districts) today. 
Furthermore, one of the most compre-hensive 
studies since the infamous ‘CAG Report’ –an 
interim performance audit conducted by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India 
(CAG) in 2007, which described the 
programme as plagued with corruption and 
deficiencies–, carried out across nine states by 
the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), 
shows that the much-hyped NREGA has 
limited takers and has failed to generate ‘any 
major interest’ among the rural poor (Das 
2008). Demand for employment in the 
programme has been particularly low in poorer 
states, such as Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, 
which have a high incidence of out-migration 
for work (Khan and Saluja 2007; Deshingkar 
2008; Shah 2006). In short, it is widely 
acknowledged that on the whole, labour 
migration has not decreased significantly since 
NREGA came into effect (Khan and Saluja 
2007; Datar 2007; Das 2008; Jacob 2008), and 
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a number of explanations for this have been 
advanced.  
The issue brought up most often in 
explaining the relative failure of NREGA is 
that of corruption. Indeed, stories of 
‘irregularities’, of “workers not being paid their 
wages, of inflated muster rolls with non-
existent workers and [of] large amounts being 
swindled out of the programme” abound (Jacob 
2008: 1; see, for example, Dhar 2011; Das 
2008; PACS 2007; Singh 2009; Khan and 
Saluja 2007). 
Wages are another, often mentioned reason 
behind the lack of demand for NREGA 
employment. In most states, workers are paid 
less – when they are paid – than the statutory 
minimum wage, which varies from state to 
state (Das 2008; Rajalakshmi 2011; Singh 
2009). Further-more, few states have been able 
to provide more than 50 average person days of 
employment per year to NREGA takers, let 
alone the 100 days to which every household is 
entitled as per the Act (Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation 2011: Table 
35.1). It is also worth noting that the 100-day 
limit takes no account of the varying number of 
people (whether of working age or dependent) 
constituting one household; this implies 
potentially vast discrepancies in the relative 
value of the income provided by employment 
under the Act. 
Technical issues have also been identified 
as a hindrance to providing enough work, 
especially in relation to the decentralised 
nature of the programme – the setting up of 
employment schemes is devolved to the Gram 
panchayats (GP). Indeed, it has been argued 
that the GPs do not have the means to design 
enough good projects and provide work for all 
employment seekers – they lack capacity 
building (Mukherjee and Ghosh 2009; Khan 
and Saluja 2007).  
Lastly, but importantly, it is said that “most 
people do not access the scheme [because] they 
have not heard of the programme” (Khan and 
Saluja 2007: 19; Jacob 2008). This point 
derives from the fact, mentioned earlier, that 
employment in NREGA is provided on a 
voluntary basis. What is more, applicants are 
expected to apply, and to receive a response, in 
written form (Jacob 2008). As a consequence, 
the socially excluded and/or illiterate are at a 
disadvantage as they may not be aware of the 
opportunity to be provided work under 
NREGA. Lack of access to information may be 
a hindrance to more people applying for work.  
     While the above factors certainly do have 
an impact, a crucial one has been left largely 
unaddressed because of the misconceptions 
about labour migration, described in the 
previous section, upon which the design of 
NREGA is based; migration for work may be 
perceived as a more attractive activity. 
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Migration as a more attractive activity? 
The view of labour mobility as essen-tially 
‘involuntary’ and driven solely by economic 
factors, which underpins the design of 
NREGA, has overshadowed the possibility that 
the limited impact of the programme may 
partly be a consequence of the perception of 
labour migration as more attractive than 
working ‘at home’, on several grounds other 
than economic. This is not to say that distress 
migration does not happen, or that economic 
factors are not important determinants; but 
those are only part of what constitutes labour 
mobility in India. 
The first set of reasons why people may 
still prefer to migrate relates to social 
dimensions. A crucial factor is that NREGA 
provides unskilled work – which, in the worst 
cases, means “digging ditches and then re-
filling them at work sites” (Jacob 2008: 1), and 
in virtually any case means that the nature of 
the work undertaken will not enable takers to 
learn new skills. As such, it is unlikely to 
improve one’s social capital (whether in 
Bourdieu’s or in Putnam’s sense), which, as 
was discussed in the first section, is often one 
of the reasons why poor people migrate (de 
Haan and Rogaly 2002; Gardner and Osella 
2003). That the work will improve one’s social 
position is equally improbable – it might even, 
in some cases, worsen it, where working under 
NREGA may be looked down on. This is 
another important factor since migration is 
often perceived as a way to challenge existing 
social relations (Gardner and Osella 2003; 
Shah 2006). 
The second point relates to what may be 
described as the relationship between migration 
and ‘modernity’, or rather perceptions of 
modernity – from the perspective of the 
migrant –, and to the capacity of the poor to 
‘aspire’ (Appadurai 2004). The design of 
NREGA stems from the assumption that all 
villagers want to work in or around the village 
and be involved in agriculture full time –that 
they want to go ‘back to farming’ (Shah in 
Indianomics 2011; cf. de Haan 1999; 
Deshingkar and Start 2003). This opposition 
between rural livelihoods and migration is 
false, and fails to grasp the role of wider 
notions of ‘modernity’ in which decisions to 
migrate are embedded – where modernity 
could be defined as ‘a set of imaginings and 
beliefs about the way life should be’ (Gardner 
and Osella 2003: xi). Indeed, as Robert 
Skeldon has it, it is often ‘not absolute poverty 
as such that is significant in accounting for 
migration but whether people feel that they are 
poor’ (Skeldon 2003: 4, emphasis added). The 
spread of information about (supposed) 
conditions elsewhere – people’s ‘mediascape’ 
(Appadurai 1996) – can alter the meaning of 
‘poverty’. And, as Arjun Appadurai has it, “the 
poor, no less than any other group in society, 
do express horizons in choices made and 
choices voiced” (Appadurai 2004: 68). In other 
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words, the rural poor too have dreams and 
aspirations – they do not just think in terms of 
survival. Often, migrants move even if they do 
not gain much – materially – from it (de Haan 
and Rogaly 2002; Shah 2006). This fact is 
often ignored in development discourses and 
welfare programmes, which may lead to design 
misconceived projects – as in the case of 
NREGA and its attempt to curb labour 
migration. 
 
 
Conclusion 
NREGA may benefit Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and, generally speaking, 
those with little or no access to positive 
migration opportunities – in other words, it 
may be a good way to curb distress migration, 
which is commendable. However, it is unlikely 
to succeed in reducing mobility for work in 
general – which is not desirable anyway. As 
Arjan de Haan put it, the central question “is 
not about migration itself, but what kinds of 
opportunities are available for what groups of 
people” (1999: 27) – economically, but also 
socially. The programme’s attempt to reduce 
labour mobility by providing unskilled, 
socially unrewarding work in rural areas stems 
from its misconception of migration for work 
as merely a product of ‘push-and-pull’ 
economic factors, and its failure – like many 
other ‘development’ programmes – to 
recognise the poor’s ‘capacity to aspire’. This 
incapacity – or refusal? – to acknowledge the 
‘rural’ poor’s aspirational horizons leaves one 
to doubt that the much-hyped NREGA really is 
the radical legislation it is often portrayed as in 
India  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 29 
References Cited 
Appadurai, A. (1996), Modernity at Large:  
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
___________. (2004), ‘The Capacity to  
Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition’, 
in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds), Culture and 
Public Action, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press: 59-84 
Bhagat, R. B. (2009), Internal Migration in  
India: Are the Underclass More Mobile?, 
Conference Paper, Marrakech: 26th IUSSP 
General Population Conference 
Breman, J. (1996), Footloose Labour:  
Working in India’s Informal Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Coffey, D., J. Papp and D. Spears (2011),  
Dual Economies or Dual Livelihoods? Short-
Term Migration from Rural India and Non-
Agricultural Employment, Princeton University 
Das, S. (2008), NREGA doesn’t have  
many takers: CSE, The Financial Express 
(New Delhi), 5 February 
Datar, C. (2007), ‘Failure of National  
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in 
Maharashtra’, Economic and Political Weekly 
42(34): 3454-57 
Dhar, D. (2011), Ramesh calls out  
NREGA failure, The Pioneer (Ranchi), 09 
October 
Desai, S. and A. Dubey (2011), ‘Caste in  
21st Century India: Competing Narratives’, 
Economic and Political Weekly 46(11): 40-49 
Deshingkar, P. (2008), ‘Circular Internal  
Migration and Development in India’, in J. 
DeWind and J. Holdaway (eds.), Migration and 
Development Within and Across Borders: 
Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal 
and International Migration, Geneva and New 
York: International Organization of Migration; 
Social Science Research Council: 163-189 
Deshingkar, P. and J. Farrington (eds) 
(2009), Circular Migration and Multilocational 
Livelihood Strategies in Rural India, New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press 
Deshingkar, P. and D. Start (2003),  
Seasonal Migration for Livelihoods in India: 
Coping, Accumulation and Social Exclusion, 
Working Paper 220, London: Overseas 
Development Institute 
Gardner, K. and F. Osella (2003),  
‘Migration, modernity and social 
transformation in South Asia: An overview’, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 37(1): v-
xxviii 
Government of India (2005), The National  
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, The Gazette 
of India No.48 Part II Section 1, 7 September 
de Haan, A. (1999), ‘Livelihoods and  
Poverty: The Role of Migration – A Critical 
Review of the Migration Literature’, Journal of 
Development Studies 36(2): 1-47 
de Haan, A. and B. Rogaly (2002),  
‘Migrant Workers and Their Role in Rural 
Change’, Journal of Development Studies 
38(5): 1-14 
Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro (1970),  
‘Migration, Unemployment and Development: 
A Two-Sector Analysis’, American Economic 
Review 60(1): 126-142 
Jacob, N. (2008), The Impact of NREGA  
on Rural-Urban Migration: Field survey of 
Villupuram District, Tamil Nadu, Working 
Paper 202, New Delhi: Centre for Civil Society 
Khan, A.U. and M.R. Saluja (2007),  
Impact of the NREGP on Rural Livelihoods, 
New Delhi: India Development Foundation 
Kothari, U. (2002), Migration and Chronic  
Poverty, Working Paper 16, Manchester: 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Institute for 
Development Policy and Management, 
University of Manchester 
Marius-Gnanou, K. (2008), ‘Debt  
bondage, seasonal migration and alternative 
issues: Lessons from Tamil Nadu’, Autrepart 
46: 127-42 
Mosse, D. (2007), Power and the  
durability of poverty: a critical exploration of 
the links between culture, marginality and 
chronic poverty, London: CPRC Working 
Paper 107 
Mosse, D. et al. (2002), ‘Brokered  
journals.ed.ac.uk/southasianist   |   ISSN 2050-487X  |  pg. 30 
Livelihoods: Debt, Labour Migration and 
Development in Tribal Western India’, Journal 
of Development Studies 38(5): 59-88 
Mukherjee, S. and S. Ghosh (2009), What  
Determines the Success and Failure of ‘100 
Days Work’ at the Panchayat Level? A Study 
of Birbhum District in West Bengal, 
Occasional Paper 16, Kolkata: Institute of 
Development Studies 
Poorest Areas Civil Society (PACS)  
(2007), Status of NREGA Implementation 
2006-07, New Delhi: Development 
Alternatives 
Rajalakshmi, T.K. (2011), Wages of  
Tokenism, Frontline 28(3), 29 January-11 
February 
Rogaly, B., D. Coppard, A. Rafique, K.  
Rana, A. Sengupta and J. Biswas (2003), 
‘Seasonal Migration and Welfare/Illfare in 
Eastern India: A Social Analysis’, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 37(1): 89-
113 
Shah, A. (2006), ‘The Labour of Love:  
Seasonal migration from Jharkhand to the brick 
kilns of other states in India’, Contributions to 
Indian Sociology 40 (1): 91-118 
Siddharta and A. Vanaik (2008), ‘CAG  
Report on NREGA: Fact and Fiction’, 
Economic and Political Weekly 43(25): 39-45 
Singh, M.P. (2009), Where NREGA is a  
failure, The Hindu (New Delhi), 6 September 
Skeldon, R. (1997), ‘Rural-to-Urban  
Migration and Its Implications for Poverty 
Alleviation’, Asia-Pacific Population Journal 
12(1): 3-16 
_________. (2003), Migration and  
Poverty, Conference Paper, Princeton: Program 
in Urbanization and Migration, Princeton 
University 
Spencer, J. (2003), ‘A Nation “living in  
different places”: Notes on the impossible work 
of purification in postcolonial Sri Lanka’, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 37(1): 1-23 
Tacoli, C., G. McGranahan and D.  
Satterthwaite (2008), ‘Urbanization, Poverty 
and Inequity: Is Rural-Urban Migration a 
Poverty Problem, or Part of the Solution?’ in G. 
Martine (ed.), The new global frontier: 
Urbanization, poverty and environment in the 
21st century, Sterling, VA: Earthscan: 37-53 
[Anonymous] (2010), ‘Government  
solving migrant labour problem: Labour 
Minister’, The Economic Times (New Delhi), 
10 March 
 
Electronic Resources 
Indianomics (2011), ‘NREGA completes  
five years: Is it a success?’, Moneycontrol, 19 
February [Accessed on 27 March 2012 at: 
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/economy/
nrega-completes-five-years-is-
itsuccess_524733-0.html] 
Ministry of Rural Development (2012)a,  
NREGA Implementation Status Report for the 
financial year 2006-2007, Government of India 
[Accessed on 21 March 2012 at: 
http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.as
px] 
Ministry of Rural Development (2012)b,  
NREGA Implementation Status Report for the 
financial year 2010-2011, Government of India 
[Accessed on 21 March 2012 at: 
http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.as
px] 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme  
Implementation (2011), Chapter 35: Rural and 
Urban Development, Government of India 
[Accessed on 29 March 2012 at: 
http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/site/India_Stati
stics.aspx] 
 
 
